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Defining "Co-Party" Within
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g):
Are Cross-Claims Between Original Defendants
and Third-Party Defendants Allowable?
JOHN

D.

BESSLER*

INTRODUCTION

The courts cannot agree on whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow cross-chums between ongrnal defendants- and third-party defendants.
Some courts allow cross-chums between such parties, I while other courts
restnct cross-claIms to defendants on the same level of the caption. 2 Still
other courts allow cross-claims between ongrnal defendants and thIrd-party
defendants only under certaIn cIrcumstances. 3 At the heart of the controversy
IS the term "co-party," whIch the Federal Rules leave undefined.
A good starting pornt for the analysIs of this Issue IS the case of Jeub v.
BIG Foods, Inc. 4 In that case, the plaIntiffs sought to recover damages
agaInst a restaurant for food poisoning. Defendant BIG Foods brought in
its supplier, Swift and Co., as a thIrd-party defendant under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 14(a). BIG Foods' rndemnification claim was based on
an allegation that Swift had supplied BIG Foods with a contaminated ham
that the defendant had subsequently served to the plaintiffs. S The Jeub
court's holding that BIG Foods' thIrd-party complaInt agaInst Swift should
stand gave effect to the language of Rule 14(a), which permits the Impleader
of a party "who is or may be liable."6 Concluding that Rule 14(a)'s purpose
is to allow courts to determrne the nghts of all partIes rn one proceeding,
the Jeub court recognized that the only alternative was to await the outcome
of the plaIntiffs' origrnal suit before allowrng BIG Foods to sue Swift for
indemnification should the first suit prove successful.7 The court brushed

* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Uruversity School of Law at Bloonungton; B.A., 1988,
Uruversity of Minnesota.
1. See mfra notes 40-57 and accompanymg text.
2. See mfra notes 29-39 and accompanymg text.
3. See mfra notes 58-77 and accompanymg text.
4. 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942).
5. [d. at 239.
6. [d. at 240 (emphasiS added).
7. [d. at 241.
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aSIde that alternative, decIding that Rule 14(a) "was promulgated to avoId
thIS very cIrcuity of proceeding. "8
Since Jeub, courts addressmg the same questIon have uniformly held that
a defendant may assert a chum agamst a thIrd-party defendant pursuant to
Rule 14(a) before the liability of the ongmal defendant IS established. 9
LikewIse, It IS undisputed that an ongmal or thIrd-party defendant may
cross-claIm agaInst a co-defendant on the same level of the captIon,1O and
that a thIrd-party defendant may counterclaIm agaInst the defendant who
ongmally brought m that thIrd-party defendant.u However, a difficulty
arIses where plaIntiffs like the ones m Jeub sue two defendants mstead of
one m theIr ongmal actIOn. In that situatIOn, suppose that the plaIntiffs
had eaten at two mdependently owned restaurants-each with the same
supplier-and that the plaIntiffs were unaware of whIch restaurant caused
theIr harm. Could the second defendant Implead the supplier VIa Rule 14(a)
if the first defendant had already done SO?12

8. [d., see also LASA Per L'Industna Del Manno Socleta Per AzIom v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir. 1969) (Impleader IS mtended "to aVOid circuity of action and to
dispose of the entire subject matter ansmg from one set of facts m one action."); J.
FRmDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIvn. PROCEDURE § 6.9 (1985) (describmg the purpose
of Rule 14).
9. See, e.g., Colton v. Swam, 527 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975); LASA, 414 F.2d 143; United
States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954); Jones v. Watennan S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992
(3d Cir. 1946).
10. FED. R. C!v P 13(g); see also Ragland v. Swmdell Dressler Corp., 186 F Supp. 769,
770 (W.D. Pa. 1960)"(a defendant cannot recover a Judgment agamst a co-defendant except
by way of a cross-clrum). Once proper, cross-clrums remam so even if the party to whom they
were addressed subsequently ceases to be a co-party. Frurvlew Park Excavating Co. v. Al
Monzo Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1126 (3d Cir. 1977); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 398 F.2d
729, 734 (3d Cir. 1968); Picou v. Rimrock Tidelands, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 188, 189-90 (E.D. La.
1962); Frommeyer v. L. & R. Constr. Co., 139 F Supp. 579, 586 (D.N.J. 1956); cf. Bell v.
Owen Thomas, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 299, 301-02 (W.D. Va. 1987) (a cross-clrum was allowed
when it was filed before the parties were disInlssed, even though leave was not granted until
after disInlssal).
11. FED. R. C!v P 14(a). Notably, the provISIons of Rule 13(h) "should not be confused
with Impleader, which IS governed by Rule 14." 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE'
13.39, at 13-230 (footnote omitted) (2d ed. 1990).
Thus if A sues X and Y on a clrum, Rule 13(h) does not authonze X to bnng
m Z, because Z IS or may be liable to rum. That situation IS governed by Rule
14. On the other hand if X pleads a counterclrum agrunst A, either compulsory
or permiSSive, or pleads a cross-clrum agrunst Y, then [Rule 13(h)] applies, and
if the presence of additional parties IS reqUired for the granting of complete relief
m the determmation of the counterclrum or the cross-clrum, the court should
order them to be brought m, if Junsdiction of them 'can be obtruned and their
JOinder will not depnve the court of Junsdiction of the action.
3 J. MOORE, supra, 1 13.39, at 13-230 to 13-233 (footnotes omitted); see mfra notes 13, 38,
114 (contrurung additional diSCUSSIOn of Rule 13(h».
12. ThiS question IS posed m J. FRmDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 8, at §
6.8, and IS answered m the negative. See also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mn.LER & M. KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1431, at 238 (1990) (stating that the rule that "best reflects the
ongmal mtent of the cross-claim provIsion" was articulated by the court m Murray v. Haverford
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Under Rule 14(a), a defendant cannot Implead another party unless that
person is "not a party to the action." 13 Given thIs fact, can the second

Hosp. Corp., 278 F Supp. 5 (B.D. Pa. 1968». Contra cases cited mfra at note 22; see also
International Tools (1973), Ltd. v. Arctic Enters., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 70, 73 n.2 (B.D. Mich.
1977) ("[I]t IS not clear that co-parties withIn the mearung of Rule 13(g) mcil,Ides thIrd-party
defendants who have been Impleaded by different thIrd-party plamtiffs."); cJ. Hansen v.
Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246, 250 (B.D. Pa. 1987) (footnote omitted)
(emphasIs m ongmal) ("Neither the Wnght and Miller treatise nor the case upon whIch it
relies appears to have contemplated the situation m whIch there IS no other procedural deVIce
to permit Jomder."). Although Hansen, whIch was deCIded m 1987, stated that the WrIght
and Miller treatise did not contemplate the situation discussed m thIs Note, the 1990 edition
of that treatise cited Hansen m a footnote under the' category of "But compare." 6 C.
WRIGHT, A. Mru.ER & M. KANE, supra, § 1435, at 272 n.3.
13. FEn. R. Crv. P 14(a). Notably, some courts have held that two ongmal defendants
can Implead the same thIrd-party defendant under Rule 14(a) on the grounds that the thIrdparty defendant IS not a party to the ongmal action, but only a party to the thIrd-party
action. See, e.g., Ruston Gas Turbmes, Inc. v. Pan Am. World AIrways, Inc., No. 81-5345
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (citing Atlantic AVIation Corp. v.
Estate of Costas, 332 F Supp. 1002, 1007 (B.D.N.Y. 1971»; Malaspma v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
21 Fed. R. Servo 2d (Callaghan) 129, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Novak v. Tigaru, 49 Del. 106,
109-10, 110 A.2d 298, 299 (Super. Ct. 1954) (applymg DEL. R. Crv P 14(a» (The phrase
"party to the action" m a Supenor Court Rule, whIch prOVIdes that a defendant may move
for leave as a thIrd-party plamtiff to serve process and a complamt on a person not a "party
to the action" who IS or may be liable to hIm for all or part of the plamtiff's claIm agaInst
hIm, means a party to the ongmal action only, and therefore the fIrst defendant could Implead,
as thIrd-party defendants, partners, who had already been Impleaded as tlurd-party defendants
by the second defendant.); see also Stotsky v. Gemng Indus., Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup.
Ct. 1988) (applymg New York law) (A thIrd-party defendant was not a "party" withIn the
mearung of a discovery statute where the plaIntiff never asserted any claIm agaInst the thIrdparty defendant.).
ThIs statutory construction makes little sense because Rule 14(a) does not distinguIsh between
"ongmal" and "thIrd-party" actions. FED. R. Crv. P 14(a). Although Rule 13(g) states that
a cross-claIm must relate to "the transaction or occurrence that IS the subject matter either of
the ongmal action or of a counterclaIm therem or relating to any property that IS the subject
matter of the ongmal action," FED. R. Crv P 13(g), the "ongmal action" language of Rule
13(g) cannot be read to prohibit cross-claIms between ongmal defendants and thIrd-party
defendants because claIms between such parties often mvolve claImS related to the subject
matter of the ongmal action. Even if the word "ongmal" IS read mto Rule 14(a)'s "not a
party to the action" language, a claIm still could not be asserted by a thIrd-party defendant
agaInst an ongmal defendant because an ongmal defendant IS undoubtedly a party to the
action.
Notably, the words "ongmal action" do appear m Federal Rule 13(h). Rule 13(h), WhICh IS
gIven the heading "Jomder of Additional Parties," prOVIdes: "Persons other than those made
parties to the ongmal action may be made parties to a counterclaIm or cross-claIm m accordance
with the prOVISIons of Rules 19 and 20." FED. R. Crv P 13(h). According to the Wnght and
Miller treatise, when a defendant
WIshes to mterpose a claIm agaInst both a codefendant and a thIrd person not
yet a partY to the action, the correct procedure IS to cross-claIm agaInst the
exIsting codefendant under Rule 13(g), and to brIng m the thIrd person as a
party defendant to the cross-claIm under the procedure for JOlrung additional
parties m Rule 13(h). If the claIm agaInst the party to be added qualifIes under
Rule 14(a), however, that party also may be brought m by a thIrd-party action.
6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mru.ER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 239 (footnote omitted).
Although the Hansen court used Rule 13(h) to allow a claIm between an ongmal defendant
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defendant assert any claIm whatsoever agamst the supplier without havmg
to file a separate summons and complamt? ObVIously, the second defendant
cannot assert a counterclaIm agamst the supplier pursuant to Rule 13(a) or
Rule 13 (b) , because the supplier IS not yet an opposmg party 14 Havmg
already ruled out the possibility of a Rule 14(a) claIm, the second defendant's
only hope must lie with Rule 13 (g) , goverrung cross-claIms}S Under Rule

and a third-party defendant, see supra note 38, the heading and language of Rule 13(h) seems
to prohibit that use of Rule 13(h). See also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note
12, § 1435, at 272 (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIv P:·13(h»:
Rule 13(h)
explicitly authonzes only the jomder of "persons other than those
made parties to the orlgmal action." As a result of thiS restnction, a person
cannot be made an additional party under Rule 13(h) if he already IS a party to
the action. Rather, the party seekmg relief may proceed directly agamst someone
who IS already before the court by usmg whatever procedural deVice IS approprlate-counterclrum or cross-clrum-depending on the alignment of the parties.
But see 3 1. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 13.39, at 13-229 & n.2. In the text, Moore asserts:
[Rule 13(h») was amended m 1966 to clarify the mtent to mclude both compulsory
and penmsslve jomder and to make specific reference to Rules 19 and 20. The
1966 amendment also makes clear that additional parties plazntiff to the counterclrum or cross-clrum, as well as additional parties defendant, may be jomed,
if jomed m accordance with the procedure and reqUirements of Rules 20 and 19.
[d. 1 13.39, at 13-229 (emphasIs m orlgmal) (footnotes omitted). To support tlus assertion,
Moore relies on the 1966 AdVISOry Committee note to Rule 13(h), which he cites m part m a
footnote. [d. 1 13.39, at 13-229 n.2. The relevant portion of the AdVISOry Committee note
provides:
Hereafter, for the purpose of determmmg who must or may be jomed as
additional parties to a counterclaim or cross-clrum, the party pleading the clrum
IS to be regarded as a plruntiff and the additional parties as plruntiffs or defendants
as the case may be, and amended Rules 19 and 20 are to be applied m the usual
fasluon.
FED. R. CIv P 13 adVISOry committee's note. For additional diSCUSSion regarding Rule 13(h),
see supra note 11 and mfra notes 38 and 114.
Because Rule 13(h) was probably not mtended to govern the scenario discussed m thiS Note,
courts need to pay special attention to the mandate of Rule 1 m construmg Rules 13(g) and
14(a). Cj. Winchell v. Lortscher, 377 F.2d 247, 252-53 (8th Cir. 1967) (The word "party," as
used witlun the meanmg of Federal Rule 73(a), IS "a legal term and a word of art which must
be VIewed m the context of the rule m which it appears as well as m the context of the other
relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). Furthermore, even if one accepts Moore's premise
that Rule 13(h) authOrizes the kmd of clrums discussed m thiS Note, It IS not entirely clear
that tlus route IS preferable. For, "[a)lthough not reqUired by Rule 13(h). the general practice
IS to obtrun a court order to jom an additional party." 6 C. WRIGHT, A/MILLER & M. KANE,
supra note 12, § 1434, at 270. Compare Id. with 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 13.39, at 13239 ("Under the 1966 revIsion of Rule 13(h), it IS not clear whether leave of the court must
be obtruned before a defendant can bring m new parties as additional defendants to a
counterclrum."). The mere possibility of an additional procedural step runs contrary to the
SPirit of Rule 1, which mandates the "just, speedy, and mexpenslve determmation of every
action." FED. R. Cry P 1.
14. FED. R. CIv P 13(a)-(b).
15. Two of the Federal Rules establish the baSIS for cross-clrums. Rule 13(g) governs crossclrums that grow out of the transaction or occurrence that IS the subject matter of the original
clrum or of a counterclaIm where the cross-claImant IS a plamtiff. WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
MANuAL § 7985 (West SUpp. 1989). Rule 18(a) applies if the cross-clrum does not grow out
of such transaction or occurrence. In a Rule 13(g) cross-claIm, subject matter JUrisdiction may
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13(g), however, cross-chums only can be asserted against "co-parties."16
Therefore, whether the second
.,. defendant will be able to clrum agrunst the
supplier ultimately will depend on the definition given the term "co-party."
If "co-party" encompasses the relatIOnshIp between the second defendant
and the supplier, a cross-clrum can be asserted and the litigation can proceed
without mterruption. On the other hand, if that relationshIp IS not a subset
of "co-party," then the second defendant will have to file a separate
complrunt agrunst the supplier. Although the second defendant can move
to consolidate the proceedings under Rule 42(a),17 thIs procedure will carry
with it added expense and delay The movant will have to spend time and
resources arguing a motion for consolidation, and the separate complrunt
will reqUIre the payment of an extra filing fee. IS
The definition gIven the term "co-party" has real consequences for the
litigation process. Part I of thIS Note discusses how courts have defined
that term and hIghlights the relevant language of the Federal Rules. Part
II explores eXIsting authority to clarify the present state of the law. Part
III focuses on the mtent of the framers of the Federal Rules, and Part IV
explores the relevant policy consIderations connected to thIs Issue. Finally,
Part V of thIS Note proposes that the term "co-party" be defined explicitly
under the Federal Rules. While the Note suggests that the term "co-party"
can be defined legitimately under eXIsting authority to allow cross-clrums

• be ancillary whereas Independent subject matter Junsdiction IS reqUIred under Rule 18(a). ld.
Rule 18(a) prOVIdes: "A party asserting a chum to relief as an ongtnal clrum, counterclrum,
cross-clrum, or thIrd-party clrum, may JOin, either as Independent or as alternate clrums, as
many clrums, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has agrunst an opposing party." FED.
R. CIV P 18(a).
16. FED. R. CIV. P 13(g). "[Clare must be taken not to confuse the procedures and
purposes of Rule 13(g), whIch are directed toward parties already In the action, with those of
Rule 14(a), whIch prOVIde for adding one or more thIrd parties to the suit." 6 C. WRIGHT,
A. Mn.lER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 238.
17. Rule 42(a) prOVIdes:
When actions involVIng a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a JOint hearing or tnal of any or all the matters In Issue
In the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to aVOId unnecessary costs or
delay.
FED. R. CIV. P 42(a); see also Doble~ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv.
261, 283 (1939) (the author was a member of the AdVISOry Committee appointed to draft the
Federal Rules) ("An exceedingly WIde discretion IS gIven to the court to consolidate separate
actions pending before the court when these Involve 'a common question of law or fact[.]"').
See generally 9 C. WRIGHT & A. Mn.tER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2381-86, at
252-76 (1971) (describing Rule 42(a) In greater detail).
18. Currently, it costs $120.00 to file a complrunt In federal court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914(a)
(West Supp. 1990). Also, although one court sarcastically noted that the resolution of thIS
"burrung Issue" may be of "greater Interest to lawyers and the academIC community than to
litigants," Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88·2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), it IS litigants who ultimately will bear theIr attorneys'
expe.nses for extra procedural difficulty.
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between ongmal defendants and tlurd-party defendants, it urges that the
Federal Rules be amended to clear up potential confusIon.

1.

BACKGROUND

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g) provIdes that "[a] pleading may
that
state as a cross-claIm any claIm by one party agaInst a co-party
IS the subject matter either of the ongmal actIon or of a counterclaIm
therem or relatmg to any property that IS the subject matter of the ongInal
action."19 Under eXIsting precedent, courts disagree whether Rule 13(g)

19. FED. R. CN P 13 (g). Several states have cross-chum rules winch also contam the
"co-party" language. See ALA. R. Crv P 13(g); A.usKA R. CN P 13(g); ARIz. R. Crv P
13(g); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-61-207(3) (1990); COLO. R. Crv P 13(g); DEL. R. Crv P 13 (g);
FLA. R. Crv P 1.170(g); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-13(g) (1989); HAw REv STAT. § 663-l7(b)
(1989); IDAHO R. Crv P 13(g); IND. TluAL R. 13 (G); IOWA R. Crv P 33; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-213(g)-(h) (1988); Ky. R. CN P 13.07; LA. CODE Crv PROC. ANN. art. 1071 (West
1986); ME. R. CN P 13(g); MD. R. Crv P 3-331(b); MAss. R. Crv P 13(g); MICH. R. Crv.
P 2.203(0); MINN. R. CN P 13.07; Mo. REv STAT. § 509.460 (1989); MONT. R. Crv. P
13 (g); NEB. REv STAT. § 25-813 (1989); NEV R. Crv P 13(g); N.J. R. Crv P 4:7-5(a);
N.M. R. Crv P 13(G); N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 13 (g); N.D. R. Crv P 13(g); Omo
R. Crv P 13(G); R.I. R. Crv P 13(g); S.C. R. Crv P 13(g); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
15-6-13(g) (1984); TENN. R. Crv P 13.07; TEX. R. Crv P 97(e); UTAH R. Crv P 13(1); VT.
R. CN P 13 (g); WASH. R. CN P 13 (g); W VA. R. Crv P 13(g); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
802.07(3) (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. R. Crv P 13 (g).
Other states do not use the term "co-party" m their cross-claIm rules. See, e.g., CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 428.10 (West 1990) ("A party agaInst whom a cause of action has been asserted
m a complaInt or cross-complaInt may file a cross-complaInt setting forth
[a]ny cause of
action he has agaInst a person alleged to be liable thereon[.]"); N.Y. Crv PRAC. L. & R.
3019 (McKinney 1974) ("A cross-claIm may be any cause of action m favor of one or more
defendants or a person whom a defendant represents agaInst one or more defendants, a person
whom a defendant represents or a defendant and other persons alleged to be liable."); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2013(G) (West Supp. 1991) ("A pleading may state as a cross-claIm any
claIm by one party agamst any party who IS not an opposmg party
"); OR. R. Crv P
22B.(1) ("In any action where two or more parties are jomed as defendants, any defendant
may m such defendant's answer allege a cross-claIm agaInst any other defendant. A crossclaIm asserted agaInst a codefendant must be one eXIsting m favor of the defendant asserting
the" cross-claim and agamst another defendant[.]"); VA. R. Crv P 3:9 ("A defendant may
plead as a cross-claIm any cause of action that he has or may have agaInst one or more
other defendants growmg out of any matter pleaded m the motion for judgment.").
In addition, the "co-party" language can be found m at least one federal statute:
The provISIons of thiS section shall not prevent the assertion, m an action agaInst
the United States or an officer or agency thereof, of any claIm of the United
States or an officer or agency thereof agaInst an opposmg party, a co-party, or
a third-party that anses out of the transaction or occurrence that IS the subject
matter of the opposmg party's claIm.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(1) (West 1978) (emphasis added).
For a history of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, see 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11,
, 13.01, at 13-7 to 13-12. See also Doble, supra note 17, at 267 (the author was a member of
the AdVISOry Committee appomted to draft the Federal Rules) ("Rule 13 makes generous and
liberal provISIons as to counterclaims and cross-claIms, with the Idea of settling m a smgle
Civil action the vanous claims of the parties."). For a general diSCUSSIOn of the development
of the Federal Rules, see Subnn, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure In HistOrical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV 909 (1987).
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allows cross-clrums between ongmal defendants and th1rd-party defendants.20
Some courts have interpreted "co-party" to mean part1es haVing like status,21
thereby precluding the use of cross-clrums under such C1rcumstances. Other
courts have mterpreted "co-party" broadly, allowmg cross-clrums agrunst
any party that 1S not an opposmg party.22 Yet another court has suggested
that "co-parties" are those parties on the same s1de of the mrun litigation. 23

20. The definition of the term "co-party" IS controversial enough for BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) to list two different mearungs. Id. at 335. Compare F JAMES &
G. HAzARD, Crvrr. PROCEDURE § 9.12 (3d ed. 1985) (defirung co-parties as those parties
"aligned together as codefendants or coplaIntiffs") with ld. at § 9.13 (footnote omitted)
(defirung a co-party as "one who IS already subject to the court's junsdiction"). While the
hypothetical situation posed In the Introduction to this Note Involved an ongInal defendant
attempting to cross-claIm agaInst a thIrd-party defendant, the opposite scenano IS also possible.
For example, a third-party defendant xrught want to me a cross-claIm agaInst a co-defendant
of the third-party plaIntiff based on a contribution or Indemnification theory. See, e.g.,
Amencan Gen. v. Equitable Gen., 87 F.R.D. 736, 737 (B.D. Va. 1980) (the third-party
defendant sought to cross-claIm agaInst co-defendants of the thIrd-party plaIntiff for rescIssion
of an Insurance policy and restitution of prexruums paId).
21. See, e.g., Hansen v. ShearsoniAmencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246 (B.D. Pa.
1987); Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F SUpp. 5 (B.D. Pa. 1968); Ruston Gas
Turbines, Inc. v. Pan Am. World AIrways, Inc., No. 81-5345 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1984) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist me); Johnson Controls, Inc..v. Rowland TompkinS Corp., 585 F Supp.
969, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Johnson Controls, No. 82-122 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1983)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file».
22. See, e.g., Georgia Ports Auth. v. ConstruZioru Meccaruche Industnali Genovesi, S.P.A.,
119 F.R.D. 693 (S.D. Ga. 1988); cf. Fogel v. United Gas Improvement Co., 32 F.R.D. 202
(B.D. Pa. 1963); Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (B.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
23. Stahl v. OhIo River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970); see also In re Queeny/
Connthos, 503 F SUpp. 361, 364 (B.D. Pa. 1980) (adopting the Stahl definition of "coparty"); AAA EqUipment & Rental, Inc. v. Bailey, 384 So. 2d 107, 109 (Ala. 1980) (applYing
ALA. R. Crv. P 13(g» ("Co-parties occupy the same Side In the pnnclpal, or InitiaJ.,
litigation."); Smith v. Lone Star Cadillac, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 791,792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
(applyIng Texas law) (adopting the Stahl definition of "co-party"); Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn.
245, 254, 52 N.W.2d 446, 451 (1952) (applYing MINN. R. Crv P 13.07) (suggesting that coparties be defined as those parties whIch are "aligned on the same Side of the litigation");
United States ex rei. Amencan Asphalt & Sealcoating Co. v. Amencan Centenrual Ins. Co.,
No. 84-4645 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (adopting the Stahl
definition of "co-party"). But see Schwab v. Ene Lackawanna R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 62, 66 (3d
Cir. 1971) (co-parties defined as those parties shanng "like status").
As an aside, the ThIrd Circuit, after its Stahl declSlon, later defined co-parties as those
parties shanng "like status." Schwab, 438 F.2d at 66; see also Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 248
(emphasIS In ongInal) ("[Alfter Schwab, the fact two parties are on the same Side of the mam
litigation IS not dispositive of the question of whether they are 'co-parties' who may, other
requirements being met, bnng cross-claIms agaInst one another."). For a diSCUSSion of the
Stahl and Schwab holdings, see Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 248. See also Capital Care Corp. v.
Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (B.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
("Third Circuit law on thiS subject IS
properly charactenzed as unsettled.").
Notably, one court appears to have adopted a hybnd form of the Murray and Stahl
definitions of "co-party." In re Queeny/Connthos, 503 F SUpp. at 364 ("The Queeny Interests
and the products defendants are Indeed co-parties shanng a like status on the same Side of
thiS litigation."). Yet another court has stated that Rule 13(g} "does not permit a cross claim
agaInst one who IS not named as a defendant by the plaintiff at the time the suit IS Instituted."
State v. Wood, 53 Del. 527, 533, 173 A.2d 327, 330 (1961) (applYing DEL. R. Cxv P 13(g».
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The Federal Rules do not define the term "co-party" Courts therefore
must look to the mtent of the framers of the Rules to determme whether
cross-chums of the type outlined above should be permItted. To date, courts
generally have exammed the hIstory of Rules 13(g) and 14(a), and the policy
consIderations behmd the Federal Rules. Rule 14(a) prOVIdes, among other
thmgs, that a thIrd-party defendant "shall make any defenses to the thIrdparty plamtiff's claIm as provIded m Rule 12 and any counterclaims agaInst
the thIrd-party plaIntiff and cross-claIms agamst other thud-party defendants, as prOVided m Rule 13."24 According to one court, at least, the
language of Rule 14(a) "amply mdicates the clear mtent of the framers of
the Federal Rules to charactenze co-parties as parties havmg like status."25
Under thiS authority, cross-claIms cannot be asserted between ongmal
defendants and third-party defendants. Other courts, usmg the policy conSiderations of Rule 126 as their gUide, favor allowmg cross-claIms between
ongmal defendants and thIrd-party defendants,2' while finding authority
weak or lackmg as to whether the framers of the Rules mtended such crossclaIms to be available. 28

II.

EXISTING COMMON LAW AUTHORITY

A. Murray and Hansen: Case Law Dlsallowmg Cross-Claims
Between Ongmal Defendants and Third-Party Defendants
According to one line of precedent, cross-claIms may be asserted only
between parties with the same or like status, such as co-defendants.29 In
24. FED. R. Cry P 14(a). For a history of Rule 14, see 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11,
, 14.01-14.02, at 14-5 to 14-20.
25. Murray, 278 F Supp. at 7
26. Rule 1 prOVides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed to secure
the Just, speedy, and mexpenslve determmation of every action." FED. R. Cry P 1.
27 See, e.g., Amerzcan Gen., 87 F.R.D. at 737
28. [d. at 738.
29. See, e.g., Schwab v. Ene Lackawanna R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 62, 65-66 (3d Cir. 1971);
Paur v. Crookston Manne, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 466, 472 (D.N.D. 1979); Malaspma v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 21 Fed. R. Servo 2d (Callaghan) 129, 129 (S.D.N.Y 1975); Land v. Highway Constr.
Co., 64 Haw. 545, 548, 645 P.2d 295,297 (1982); see also Shafarman V. Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc., 100 F.R.D. 454, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citation omitted) ("co-parties are parties at the
same level"). But cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat'r Bank, 675 F.2d 633, 636 n.4 (5th Cir.
1982) (citation omitted) ("Because the competmg claimants m an mterpleader action are
nommally all defendants, chums asserted by one mterpleader clatmant agatnst \ another are
conSidered cross-claims."); General Ins. Co. of Am. V. Hercules Constr. Co., 385 F.2d 13
(8th Cir. 1967) (There, a general contractor brought a diverSity action agamst a subcontractor's
surety on a performance bond. [d. at 16. Later, the subcontractor mtervened, although the
general contractor never amended Its complrunt to seek damages agamst the subcontractor
because thiS would have destroyed diversity. While the surety never attempted to cross-clrum
agatnst the subcontractor, the court stated m dicta that It could have done so under Rule
13(g). [d. at 18-19. Because the general contractor never sued both the subcontractor and the
surety, the subcontractor and the surety were not parties of like status as defined by Murray.
This IS Significant because the court m Hercules would have allowed such non-Similar parties
to brmg cross-claims agamst one another pursuant to Rule 13(g).).
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Murray v. Haverford Hospital Corp.,30 for example, several defendants filed
what they labelled a "cross clrum" against a person whom the plruntiff had
not sued.31 The Murray court dismissed the complrunt without prejudice,32
stating:
Tlurd-party practice IS specifically provIded for In F.R.C.P 14, whIch
proVIdes, Inter alia, that the tlurd-patty defendant "shall make hIS
defenses to the thIrd-party plaIntiff's claIm as proVIded In Rule 12 and
his counterclaIms agaInst the thIrd-party plaIntiff and cross-clazms against
other thzrd-party defendants, as provzded In Rule 13."
The language quoted amply Indicates the clear Intent of the framers
of the Federal Rules to charactenze co-parties as parties haVIng like
status. Were the Intent otherwise confUSion would result, as In this case,
with some defendants servIng third-party complaInts under Rule 14, after
obtaining leave of court, and other defendants Simply filing cross-claIms
purportedly under Rule 13 (g) , wluch does not reqUire summons and
complaInt or, under any circumstances, leave of court to serve notice
to the plaIntiff upon motion and notice to all parties to the action. 33

In Hansen v Shearson/Amerzcan Express, Inc.,34 the same federal court
reaffIrmed the rule it ha!i delineated prevIOusly fu Murray.3s The Hansen
court pointed out that, "[a]s ongInally drafted, Rule 14(a) prOVIded that
the thud-party defendant was to bnng counterclrums and cross-clrums agrunst
'the plaintiff, the thIrd-party plruntiff, or any other party as prOVIded In
RuIe 13."'36 Noting that RuIe 14(a) was amended In 1946 to prOVIde for
30. 278 F Supp. 5 (B.D. Pa. 1968). As the Murray case illustrates, some confUSIOn eXIsts
about the difference between an mdemnity cross-chum between co-defendants and a Rule 14
lffipleader chum for mdemnity. See Gentry v. WiImmgton Trust Co., 321 F Supp. 1379 (D.
Del. 1970). "Any errors m nomenclature actually should not be SIgnificant, however, smce
both Rule 13(g) and Rule 14(a) c1rums come under the ancillary Junsdiction of the court and
basIcally the same standards apply for determmmg whether to allow theIr assertion." 6 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1407, at 40. For a more complete diSCUSSIon
of ancillary Junsdiction, see mfra note 70.
31. Murray, 278 F Supp. at 6.
32. ld. at 7. The order preserved the defendants' nght to file and serve a tIurd-party
complrunt m compliance with Rule 14(a). ld..
33. ld. at 6-7 (emphasIS m ongmal). But see Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No.
88-2682 (B.D. Pa. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (allowmg cross-c1rums by thIrdparty defendants agrunst ongmal defendants).
34. 116 F.R.D. 246 (B.D. Pa. 1987). The Hansen case began as'a suit by Elizabeth Hansen
agrunst the brokerage firm of Shearson/Amencan Express and two of its brokers, C. Joseph
Manfredo and S. Paul Palmer. ld. at 247. Hansen alleged that the defendants had nushandled
her securities account. Shears on filed a third-party complrunt agrunst Arthur L. Guptill, the
plruntiff's brother-m-Iaw, allegmg that Guptill had ratified the allegedly Improper transactions.
Guptill then filed c1rums, wInch he captioned as "counterclrums and crossclrums," agrunst
Shearson, Manfredo and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. In 1984, Hansen resolved her c1rums
agrunst Shearson, Manfredo and Palmer. LikeWIse, Guptill resolved Ins c1rums agrunst Shearson
and Edwards m 1985. Thus, the only c1rum remrumng m the case m 1987 when the Hansen
case was decIded was Guptill's c1rum agrunst Manfredo. ld. "The difficult question posed by
Manfredo's motion to dismISS IS whether such a c1rum IS proper." ld. at 248 (footnote omitted).
35.ld.
36. ld. at 249.
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"'counterclrums agrunst the thIrd-party plruntiff, and cross-clrums agamst
other third-party defendants as proVIded In Rule 13'[,]"37 the Hansen court
held that "a clrum by a thIrd-party defendant agrunst a co-defendant of the
thIrd-party plruntiff may not properly be charactenzed as a cross-claIm. "38

37 [d. (emphasIs m ongmal).
38. [d. The court also concluded that "Guptill's claim agrunst Manfredo IS not properly
charactenzed as a counterclaim-at least not m its own nght." [d. In the words of the court:
"Manfredo had filed no clrum agrunst Guptill which would have rendered Guptill an 'opposmg
party' with the mearung of Rule 13." [d. (citations omitted). However, emphaslzmg that
Guptill had also brought a clrum agrunst Shears on-the defendant who had brought Guptill
mto the action-the court held that "the relationship between Guptill's counterclrum agrunst
Shearson and Guptill's clrum agamst Manfredo IS sufficiently close to permit jomder under
Rule 20(a}." [d. at 250 (citation omitted). See supra note 34 for a more detailed descnption
of the facts of Hansen.
According to the court m Hansen:
Rule 13(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which mcorporates Rules 19
and 20 by reference, provides for the jomder of parties to permit full adjudication
of counterclrums m one proceeding. Under Fed.R.Civ.P 20(a), parties may be
any nght to relief m respect of or
jomed "if there IS asserted agrunst them
ansmg out of the same transaction, occurrence, or senes of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
anse m the action." Rule 13(h}, unlike Rule 13 (g) , does not reqUire that the
clrum agrunst the additional party arise out of the "transaction or occurrence
that IS the subject matter of the ongmal action or of a counterclrum therem."
Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250 (quoting FED. R. Crv P 20(a}). Stressmg that Rule 13(h) "pertruns
by its terms only to the jomder of '[p)ersons other than those made parties to the ongmal
action,''' the Hansen court noted that the Federal Rules "make no express provlSlon for a
situation, like the one before us, m wInch a counterclrumant seeks to add to hiS counterclrum
a party who might properly have been jomed under Rule 13(h) but who IS already a party to
the action." Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250 (quoting FED. R. Crv P 13(h». The Hansen court
pomted out that there are "few deCided cases on tIns question," and further noted that "the
leading commentators are diVided." Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250. As the Hansen court quoted
directly from the Wnght and Miller treatise:
"Rule 13(h) explicitly authonzes only the jomder of 'persons other than those
made parties to the ongmal action.' As a result of tIns restnction, a person
cannot be made an additional party under Rule 13(h) if he already IS a party to
the action. Rather, the party seekmg relief may proceed directly agamst someone
who IS already before the court by usmg wha,tever procedural deVIce IS appropnate-counterclrum or cross-clrum-depending on the alignment of the parties."
Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250 (quoting 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 1435, at 189 (footnote omitted) (1971) (quoting FED. R. Crv P 13(h))). "The
Moore treatise suggests, however, that one who IS already a party to the underlYIng litigation
may be treated as an additional party to a counterclrum under Rule 13(h}." Hansen, 116
F.R.D. at 250 (citing 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 14.17, at 14-95 to 14-96, m wInch Moore
approves of the use of Rule 13(h) for a tInrd-party defendant to jom a plruntiff where the
tInrd-party defendant wants to counterclrum jomtly agrunst the plruntiff and a defendant}.
Compare 6 C. WRIGHT & A. Mn.LER, supra, § 1435, at 189 and 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11,
, 13.39, at 13-229 (footnote omitted) (emphasiS m ongmal) ("The 1966 amendment [to Rule
13(h)) also makes clear that additional parties plamtiff to the counterclrum or cross-clrum, as
well a~ additional parties defendant, may be jomed, if jomed m accordance with the procedure
and requirements of Rules 20 and 19."} with G. SHREVE & P RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING
Cxvn. PROCEDURE § 55, at 221 n.l (1989) ("[W)hile Rule 13(h) mdicates that one may jom a
party m order to make a counterclrum or cross-clrum, the provISIon makes clear that such
expansIOn must separately satisfy rules pertrurung to party jomder[.)"}. See also supra notes
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The court emphasIzed that the amendment to Rule 14(a) was not "specifically explamed" by the AdVISOry Committee and declared:
The AdvISOry Committee notes to the 1946 amendment state that changes
not specifically explaIned were meant to be "verbal or conformIng." It
would thus appear that, In the VIew of the AdVISOry Committee, the
specification that the "other part[ies]" agaInst whom a thIrd-party
defendant might bnng cross-clrums were "other thIrd-party defendants"
was not VIewed as a substantive change In Rule 14(a).39

B.

Fogel and GeorgIa Ports Authority: Case Law Allowmg
Cross-Claims Between Onginal Defendants
and Thlrd-Party Defendants

Another line of authority supports the assertion of cross-claIms between
orIgmal defendants and thIrd-party defendants. 40 In Fogel v Umted Gas
Improvement CO.,41 for mstance, the plaIntiff's decedent was killed by a
gas explOSIon. The plaIntiff sued both the owner of the gas maIn and the
contractor who was laYing the maIn. The contractor Jomed the engmeerIng
firm as a thlrd-party defendant. The owner of the gas maIn filed a crossclaim against the engmeerIng firm for mdemnification m the event that the
owner should be held liable to the plaIntiff. 42 Holding the cross-claIm
permlssible, the court noted: '''Co' IS a prefix whIch 'SIgnifies m general
with, together, In conjunction, JOintly.' Even though [the thlrd-party defendant's] position m the case IS somewhat different from the positions of the

11 & 13 and mfra note 114 (contammg additional diSCUSSIOn of Rule 13(h»; 6 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1434, at 267-70 (distingulshmg the application and
purposes of Rule 13(h) from that of Rule 14(a».
Thus, m the end, despite the unwillingness of the Hansen court to characterIze the claIm at
ISsue as a "cross-claIm," it ultimately allowed the litigation to proceed without mterruption.
In addition to citing Rule 1, the court concluded:
We are of the View that the purpose of Rule 13(h), whIch "is to dispose of an
action m its entirety and to grant complete relief to all the concerned parties,"
would best be served by resolVing what appears to be an overSight 10 the Rules
10 favor of permitting one who might properly have been Jomed pursuant to
Rule 13(h), but who IS already a party to the litigation, to be Jomed 10 the
adjudication of a pemusslve counterclaIm brought by a thIrd-party defendant. In
such a situation, we see no purpose m requIrIng the thIrd-party defendant to
serve process on the party to be Jomed 10 the SaIne manner as would be reqUIred
had that party not already been a party to the action.
Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250-51 (citatIons omitted) (quoting 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra,
§ 1434, at 188).
39. Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 249. Actually, the AdVISOry Committee's notes to the 1946
aInendment do not actually state that changes not specifically explaIned were meant to be
"verbal or confomung." See mfra note 83 for the precise language of the AdVISOry Committee's
note of 1946.
40. See cases cited supra note 22.
41. 32 F.R.D. 202 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
42. [d. at 203.
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ongmal defendants, It IS a co-party withm the meanmg of Rule 13(g). "43
Similarly, m Georgia Ports Authonty v. ConstruZlOm Meccamche Industnali GenovesI, S.P.A.,44 a federal distnct court reached the same concluslon. 45 In Georgia Ports Authority, the plamtiff sued a contractor and its
surety allegmg breach of contract. The surety then filed a third-party
complamt agamst the subcontractor responsible for the work at Issue. 46 The
court allowed the contractor to file a subsequent cross-clrum agrunst the
subcontractor,47 notmg that the cases disallowmg cross-clrums by an.ongmal
defendant against a third-party defendant had also assumed that the clrum
could be asserted alternatively as a third-party complrunt under Rule 14(a).48
Emphaslzmg that a clrum under Rule 14(a) may be asserted only agrunst a
person not a party to the action,49 the court m Georgia Ports Authority
rejected the Murray constructIOn of "co-party "SO The court noted that,
under Murray's mterpretatlOn of "co-party," the contractor's only option
would be to file an mdependent action agrunst the subcontractor.51 Furthermore, followmg the Murray rule would result m a Catch-22 situation. ~2
Under Murray, the contractor could not assert a third-party complrunt under
Rule 14(a) because the subcontractor was a party to the action before the
contractor lodged its claim agrunst the subcontractor; yet, because the
subcontractor and the contractor were not "co-parties" as defined under
Murray, a cross-clrum could not be asserted under Rule 13(g).53 "Codefendants [would be] forced to· race to be the first defendant to Implead
a particular third-party defendant. "54
The Court cannot accept that such a result was Intended by the Federal
Rules. The Rules are to "be construed to secure the Just, speedy, and
InexpenSive determInation of every action." Fed. R. Civ P 1. To
construe Rule 13(g) as not encompassIng clrums asserted by ongInal
defendants agrunst third party defendants would force additional, Independent actions to be filed. JOInder would then be proper. ThiS only
accomplishes the creation of an extra file. Here, where tnal IS only a

43. Id. at 204 (emphaSIS m ongmal) (quoting WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 510 (2d
ed. 1948».
44. 119 F.R.D. 693 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
45. Id. at 695.
46. Id. at 694.
47. Id. at 695.
48. Id. at 694. Even m cases where cross-clatms were not allowed between ongmal
defendants and third-party defendants, the attempted clatms were regularly dismissed without
prejudice. See, e.g., Ruston Gas Turbmes, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 815345 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 1, 1984) (LEXlS, Genfed library, Dist file); Paur, 83 F.R.D. at 474;
Malaspma, 21 Fed. R. Servo 2d (Callaghan) at 130; Murray, 278 F Supp. at 7.
49. Georgia Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 694.
50. Id. at 695.
51. Id. at 694.
52.Id.
53. Id. at 694-95.
54. Id. at 695.
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few weeks away, delay and duplication of expense could also be accomplished."

Concluding that the term "co-party" witlnn Rule 13(g) lJl.eans "any party
that is not an opposmg party, "56 the court- m GeorgIa Ports Authority
criticized the common law opposmg tlns result. The court stated:
In some of the cases holding that an ongmal defendant may not assert
a cross-chum agaInst a thIrd-party defendant, it has been suggested that
such parties are not "co-parties" because they are adverse. Tins concern
IS absurd: anytime a cross-clrum IS fIled, the parties are necessarily
adverse (one of the parties IS swng the other!). The very fact that crossclaIms are allowed contemplates the presence of adversity between crossclaIm plaIntiffs and cross-clrum defendants, and therefore, between "coparties. "57

C.

Amencan General: Case Law Allowzng Cross-Claims
Between Original Defendants and Third-Party
Defendants Under Certain Circumstances

In Amencan General v. Equitable General,58 American General Insurance
Co. fIled a complamt alleging securities acts VIOlatIons agamst Equitable
General COl}). and its directors. 59 After Gulf Life Insurance Co. was
substituted by an order of the court as a party defendant m place of
Equitable General,60 the court granted Gulf Life's motion for leave to bnng
cross-clrums agamst two of the named directors, Phillips and Eslinger, and
a tlnrd-party complaint agaInst Contmental Casualty CO.61 The court also
granted leave for Phillips and Eslinger to bring tlnrd-party complaInts
agaInst Continental.62 Gulf Life subsequently fIled cross-claims agaInst Phillips and Eslinger and a third-party complaInt against Continental. Phillips
and Eslinger also fIled a third-party complamt against Continental. 63 A
short time later, Continental fIled answers to Gulf Life's substituted amended
third-party complaInt, Phillips' fIrst amended third-party complaInt and
Eslinger's tlnrd-party complaint. 64 Continental also fIled counterclauns agaInSt
Gulf Life, Phillips and Eslinger, and cross-claIms agamst the other named
directors. 65 In its counterclauns and cross-claims, Continental sought resCISSIOn

55.Id.
56.Id.
57. Id. (citations omitted).
58. 87 F.R.D. 736 (E.D. Va. 1980).
59. Id. at 736.
60. Id. at 736 n.l.
61. Id. at 737.
62.Id.
63.ld.
64.Id.
65.Id.
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of a Contmental msurance policy purportedly covermg the named defendants
and restitutIon of the premmms prud. 66 The Issue presented to the courtby way of a motIon to dismIss brought by the other named directors,
Willard, Sanders, Boddiger and Chatelrun-was whether Rules 13(g) and
14(a) permitted the thIrd-party defendant, Contmental, to file cross-clrums
agrunst co-defendants, the four director-movants, of the thrrd-party plruntiffs, Gulf Life and directors Phillips and Eslinger. 67
After notmg that no benefit would be gruned by disIDlssmg the crossclrums, the Amencan General court held that, absent a showmg of prejudice,
cross-clrums brought by a thIrd-party defendant agrunst co-defendants of
the thrrd-party plruntiffs would stand. 68 PartIcularly, the court asserted that
an exammation of the hIstory of Rule 14(a) does not mdicate a clear
mtention to prohibit the filing of such cross-clrums. Thus, absent some
showmg of prejudice, the court did not feel "specifically prohibited by Rule
from permittmg the filing of [such] cross-clrums. "69 Only if the movants
could show lack of diversity or an mability to obtrun servIce of process,
for example, would the court have disallowed the cross-clrums brought by
Continental, the thIrd-party defendant, agrunst the four directors. 7o

66. Id.
67. Id. at 736.
68. Id. at 739; see also International Tools (1973), Ltd. v. Arctic Enters., Inc., 75 F.R.D.
70, 72 n.2 (B.D. Mich. 1977) (allowmg chums asserted by a third-party defendant agamst
third-party defendants Impleaded by different third-party plamtiffs to stand despite the court's
statement that "it IS not clear that co-parties withm the mearung of Rule 13(g)" mcludes such
parties).
69. AmerIcan Gen., 87 F.R.D. at 738.
70. Id. According to the AmerIcan General court:
Permitting a cross-clrum rather than requmng the filing of an ongmal complrunt
might affect the movants with respect to the Junsdiction of the Court and with
respect to service of process. A requirement for filing a complrunt m federal
court IS mdependent federal Junsdiction. ThiS IS not a requirement for the filing
of a cross-claim, smce it arises out of the same transaction and, therefore, ·IS
ancillary to the mrun cause of action. Also, the filing of a complrunt requires
that the plruntiff obtrun service of process over the defendants pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P 4 while the filing of a cross-clrum requires no additional servIce of
process. Had the movants alleged that there was a lack of complete diversity
between them and Continental, or that Continental could not have obtruned
service of process over the movants, the movants clearly would have been
prejudiced by allowmg the cross-clrums to stand. Under such Circumstances, the
Court would not have hesitated to grant the motion to dismiSS.
Id. (citation omitted).
However, ancillary Junsdiction of cross-clrums between ongmal defendants and third-party
defendants IS proper-mdeed favored-under the law. According to one source:
With regard to cross-clrums few Junsdictional problems are encountered. Under
the federal rules a cross-clrum must relate to the transaction sued on m the
complrunt. ThiS relationship m turn IS a baSIS of ancillary federal Junsdiction.
Ordinarily no problem of personal Junsdiction IS presented, for a cross-clrum by
definition IS agamst a coparty, I.e., one who IS already subject to the court's
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The American General court was willing to gIve effect to the
decISlons typified by Murray if the movant could establish

Junsdiction.
F JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note '20, § 9.13, at 496-97 (footnotes omitted). As another
source has explained:
Once the court detenrunes that complete Justice between the parties with respect
to the onglnal action reqwres the adjudication of the cross·chum, then it IS quite
lOgical to take the additional step and hold that Junsdiction to entertaIn the
complrunt Includes the power to consider the cross·clrum, even though Junsdiction
would not eXist if the clrum were brought as an Independent action.
6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mu.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1433, at 256. "[S]ince cross-clrums
are subject to basically the same transactional test as compulsory counterclaims under Rule
13(a), the two should be treated sunilarly for Junsdictional purposes." 6 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1433, at 256 (footnote omitted). .
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether the federal courts have Junsdiction over a state claim In
the absence of diversity. The Court held that constitutional power eXiSts to decide a state
clrum whenever it IS so related to the federal claim that "the entire action before the court
compnses but one constitutional 'case. '" Id. at 725 (footnote omitted). As part of the test set
forth In Gibbs, the federal and state clrums must denve from "a common nucleus of operative
fact." Id., see also G. SHREVE & P RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 38, § 31, at 122-23 (suggesting
Gibbs has a three-part test for "constitutional case"). In so holding, "the Court expressly
recogruzed that the view of the drafters of the Federal Rules as to the scope of a lawsuit was
relevant." 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 14.26, at 14-118 (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 n.13);
see also Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal JurISdiction, 28 STAN. L.
REv 395, 418 (1976) (The Gibbs case "acknowledged the extent to whIch the procedural
poliCies of the new Federal Rules Influenced its deCISIon."). Compare Id., with C. WRIGHT, A.
Mu.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1433, at 253-56 (footnote omitted) ("The practice of
treating cross-claims as part of the court's ancillary Junsdiction came Into eXIstence even pnor
to the federal rules.").
Although Gibbs presented a case of pendent Junsdiction rather than ancillary Junsdiction,
Gibbs emphasized that, "[u]nder the [Federal] Rules, the Impulse .IS toward entertrurung the
broadest possible scope of action consistent with frurness to the parties; JOinder of claims,
parties and remedies IS strongly encouraged." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724; see also G. SHREVE &
P RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 38, § 30, at 119-21 (explainIng the difference between pendent
and ancillary Junsdiction). Indeed, the only major case restnctlng the availability of ancillary
Junsdiction IS Owen Eqwpment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). See generally
Berch, The Erection- of a Bamer Against Assertion of Ancillary Claims: An Examination of
Owen EqUipment and Erection Company v. Kroger, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 253, 260-62 (suggesting
that Kroger may be of limited Significance).
In Kroger, the Supreme Court addressed the question, "In an action In which federal
Junsdiction IS based on diversity of citizenshIp, may the plruntiff assert a clrum agrunst a thIrdparty defendant when there IS no Independent basiS for federal JUrIsdiction over that clrum?"
Kroger, 437 U.S. at 367. DeCiding that a plruntiff may not assert such a clrum, the Court
started with the assumption that the plruntiff's claims against the nondiverse thIrd-party
defendant and the plruntiff's claims agrunst the ongInal, diverse defendant arose from a
"common nucleus of operative fact." Jd. at 371 n.l0. However, the Court held that that was
suffiCient only to bnng the nondiverse claim withIn the "constitutional limits of federal JudiCial
power." Id. at 371. It did not necessarily follow, the Court stated, that the nondiverse clrum
was withIn the statutory grant of federal Junsdiction made by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(I), as
expanded by the concept of ancillary JUrIsdiction. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 371-72. "Constitutional
power IS merely the first hurdle that must be overcome In detenmmng that a federal court
has Junsdiction over a particular controversy. For the JUrIsdiction of the federal courts IS
limited
also by Acts of Congress." Id. at 372. Holding that the "context" In which a
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pre]udice,71 but found no such prejudice In that case.72 ASIde from finding
that the Intent of the framers of the Federal Rules under Rule 13(g) IS
unclear,?3 thIS case IS sIgnificant for two reasons. First, like the court In
Georgia Ports Authorzty, the Amerzcan General court adopted Rule 1 as its
gUlde to the framers' Intent.'4 Second, because Amerzcan General allowed
arguably Improper cross-clrums to stand,7S the case suggests that litigatlOn
InvolvIng otherwIse illegItImate cross-claIms between ongInal defendants and

nondiverse clrum IS asserted IS "crucIal," ld. at 376, the Kroger Court noted two major
differences between the plruntiff's attempted clrum agrunst the nondiverse thIrd-party defendant
In its case and those nondiverse clrums routinely held to be withIn a federal court's ancillary
Junsdiction. First, the plruntiff's proposed clrum agrunst the nondiverse thIrd-party defendant
was siinply not ancillary to the federal one In the same sense that, for example,
the Impleader by a defendant of a thIrd-party defendant always IS. A thIrd-party
complrunt depends at least In part upon the resolution of the pnmary lawsuit.
Its relation to the original complrunt IS thus not mere factual SImilarity but logIcal
dependence.
Id. (citation omitted). Second, it was the plruntiff In Kroger who was attempting to assert the
nondiverse clrum. Id.
By contrast, ancillary JUrISdiction tYPIcally Involves clrums by a defending party
A plruntiff cannot complrun if ancillary
haled Into court agaInst hIS will
JUrisdiction does not encompass all of hIS possible clrums In a case such as thIs
one, since it IS he who has chosen the federal rather than the state forum and
must thus accept its limitations.
Id.
As many scholars have noted, the U.S. Supreme Court's analysIs of ancillary Junsdiction
In Kroger explaIns the doctrine's extensIon to cross-clrums under Rule 13(g) and Impleader
claIms under Rule 14. See, e.g., G. SHREVE & P RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 38, § 32, at 128
("Each of these kinds of JOInder requIres a transactional nexus under the rules between the
JOined and the anchor clrum (thUS satisfYIng the common nucleus requirement), and each IS
Invoked defenSIvely by a defendant or another party who has no practical chOIce of forum. ").
Since both origInal defendants and thIrd-party defendants are In defenSive legal postures,
construIng "co-party" to allow claIms between such parties would be conSIStent with Kroger
and the doctnne of ancillary JUrisdiction. Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated In Kroger, "[i]t
IS not unreasonable to assume that, In generally requmng complete diversity, Congress did not
Intend to confine the JUrISdiction of federal courts so Inflexibly that they are unable to protect
legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logIcally entwined lawsuit." Kroger, 437 U.S.
at 377.
Thus, American General, by requmng a party to file an Independent action where prejudice
IS found to eXIst, runs contrary to the trend of federal courts In allOWing the use of ancillary
JUrISdiction. Moreover, the approach of American General ignores the congresSIOnally approved
mandate of Rule 1 that the Federal Rules be construed to secure the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Crv P 1; see also Goldberg, supra, at
442-43 (diSCUSSIng the Interaction of Rule 1 and Rule 82).
71. American Gen., 87 F.R.D. at 738.
72. Id. at 739.
73. Id. at 738.
74. Id. at 739; see also Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("[G]iven the encouragement" of Federal Rule
I, "it does not make sense to Interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure as precluding the thlrdparty defendant from filing a thIrd-party complrunt agrunst the other (Le., non-thlrd-party
plruntiff) defendants on the ground that they are already parties to the action, hence not
covered by Rule 14[.]").
75. See Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 248 n.2.
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thIrd-party defendants could be allowed to continue without interruption so
long as the cross-clrums were withm the subject matter of the original action
and did not prejudice the partIes agrunst whom they were brought.76 In
other words, if a court finds that an "illegitimate" cross-clrum would have
been properly consolidated with the ongmal action had the correct procedure
been followed, a court could exercise its broad equitable powers to allow
the cross-claim to stand. 77

76. Another approach, adopted by some courts, IS to sever a plaIntiff's claIms agaInst two
defendants pursuant to Rule 21, so that both defendants can Implead'the same thIrd-party
defendant under Rule 14(a), See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1446,
at 375; 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, , 14.14, at 14-84 to 14-87; see also Field v. Volkswagenwerk
AG, 626 F.2d 293, 298 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) ("[M]ost courts that have
consIdered the problem have resolved it by usmg [Rule] 14(a) m conjunction with theIr broad
severance powers under Civil Rule 21."); Henz v. Supenor Truckmg Co., 96 F.R.D. 219, 221
(M.D. Pa. 1982) (the defendant m a personal mJury actIon brought by a husband and wife
was held entitled to sever the claIms of the husband and wife so that the defendant could
pursue an action for contribution and mdemnity agaInst the husband as a thIrd-party defendant); SlaVICS v. Wood, 36 F.R.D. 47, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1964).(emphasls In ongInal) (quoting FED.
R. Crv. P 14(a» ("It IS necessary to resort to Rule 21, because Rule 14 only allows a
''');
defendant to Jom as a thIrd-party defendant '* * a person not a party to the action
cf. Campbell v. Meadow Gold Prods. Co., 52 F.R.D. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (when the
defendant removed a state action to a federal court and sought to counterclaIm for contribution
agaInst one plaIntiff, the proper procedure would have been severance and Jomder under Rules
21 and 14(a) respectively). Not only does thIs approach aVOId the problem of defendants
haVIng to race to be the first to Implead a thIrd-party, but the two proceedings can then be
consolidated pursuant to Rule 42.
However, thIs approach seems InCOnSIstent with Rule l's mandate that the Federal Rules be
construed to secure the "just, speedy, and mexpenSlve determmation of every action." Georgia
Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695 n.2. Notably, although thIs severance procedure IS supported
by a literal reading of Rule 14(a), at least three scholars endorse the approach of a Minnesota
federal distnct court, whIch allowed Impleader as an mitial matter without gomg through the
ritual of severance followed by Impleader and Jomder, to aVOId thIs cumbersome procedure.
6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mn.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1446, at 376 & n.30 (citIng United
States ex rei. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Nicholas, 28 F.R.D. 8, 10-11 (D. Minn.
1961»; see also Novak v. Tigaru, 49 Del. 106, 109, 110 A.2d 298, 299 (Super. Ct. 1954)
(applymg DEL. R. Crv. P 14(a» (citation omitted) (the court was "unwilling to conclude that
the authors of Civil Rule 14, and of Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from
WhICh our Rule was taken, mtended the CIrCUItous and awkward method of severance, thlrdparty action and consolidation").
77. Courts have used analogous theones to keep claIms alive In cases where a pleading
Improperly desIgnated a defense as a counterclaIm or a counterclrum as a defense, or m cases
where counterclaIms or cross-clalms have been mIslabelled. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1275, at 457-60 (1990); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MnLER & M.
KANE, supra note 12, § 1407, at 39-40; see also FED. R. Crv. P 8(c) ("When a party has
mIstakenly desIgnated a defense as a counterclaIm or a counterclaIm as a defense, the court
on terms, if Justice so reqUIres, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper
desIgnation."); Kwong v. OCCIdental Life Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 691, 693 n.2 (5th Cir. 1960) (a
"cross-claIm" filed by defendants agaInst an msurer would be treated as a compulsory
counterclaIm); Sachs v. Sachs, 265 F.2d 31, 33 (3d Cir. 1959) (where a wife's prayer for
support payments appeared under the heading of a separate defense m her husband's divorce
action, the tnal court properly treated the request as a counterclaIm); United States v. Summ,
282 F Supp. 628, 631 (D.N.J. 1968) (a defendant's counterclaIm could be treated as claIm
for recoupment); Falclam v. PhiladelphIa Transp. Co., 189 F Supp. 203, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1960)
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THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS OF THE FEDERAL RULES

In Murray, the court declared that the language of Rule 14(a) amply
mdicates the clear mtent of the framers to prohibit cross-chums by ongInal
defendants agaInst tlurd-party defendants. 78 Similarly, the Hansen court held
that cross-claIms could not be asserted by thIrd-party defendants agaInst
co-defendants of thIrd-party plaIntiffs.79 Both these rulings rely on an
amendment to Rule 14(a) that was never explamed by the AdVISOry Committee. 8o Before thIS 1946 amendment, a thIrd-party defendant under Rule
14(a) was to bnng counterclaIms and cross-claIms agaInst "the plaIntiff, the
thIrd-party plaIntiff, or any other party as provIded m Rule 13."81 After
the amendment, counterclaIms were to be brought agaInst the plaIntiff and
the thrrd-party plaIntiff, and cross-claIms were to be brought "agaInst other
thIrd-party defendants as provIded m Rule 13."82 Relymg on the silence of
the AdVIsory Committee notes to the 1946 amendment on thIs pomt and
the statement that changes that were not specifically explaIned were meant
to be "verbal or conformmg,"83 the Hansen court concluded that the
AdVIsory Committee mtended no substantIve change to Rule 14(a) when
"other part[ies]" was amended to read "other thIrd-party defendants."84
In short, the court concluded that, pnor to the 1946 amendment, ongmal
defendants had not been mcluded among "other part[ies]" agaInst whom
a thIrd-party defendant could brmg cross-claIms.

(a bus owner ffi1ght assert a clrum against an automobile dnver for drunage to a bus regardless
of whether the clrum was called a counterclrum or a cross-clrum).
Furthermore, one court has noted that, even if "co-party" IS defined so that cross-clrums
are only allowed between parties of exactly SImilar status, any techrucal objection to an
"improper" cross-clrum would be wruved if a party delayed In asserting it. Georgia Ports
Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695 n.2.
78. Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F Supp. 5, 7 (B.D. Pa. 1968). But see Hansen
v. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246, 248 (B.D. Pa. 1987) ("The mearung of
the term 'co-party' IS not self-eVIdent, even with [the] Interpretive gloss placed on it by the
court In Murray. ").
79. Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 249.
80. See mfra note 83 for the precIse language of the AdVISOry Committee's note of 1946
to Rule 14.
81. Fed. R. Civ. P 14{a), 28 U.S.C. (1941).
82. FED. R. Crv P 14{a).
83. Contrary to the Hansen court's suggestion, the AdVISOry Committee's note of 1946
does not contain the exact "verbal or conforffi1ng" language. Tlus language appears to come
from a scholar's Interpretation of the hIstory of Rule 14{a). Although the 1990 edition of
Moore's Federal Practice no longer contains such a reference, the language does appear In
that treatIse as late as the 1989 edition. 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, , 14.01[1],
at 14-8 (2d ed. 1989) ("Other changes were verbal or conforming."). The AdVISOry Committee's
note of 1946 to Rule 14 actually reads: "The elimination of the words 'the thIrd-party plruntiff,
or any other party' from the second sentence of Rule 14{a), together with the Insertion of the
new phrases therein, are not changes of substance but are merely for the purpose of
clarification." FED. R. Crv P 14 adVISOry committee's note.
84. Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 249.
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However, by focusmg solely on an unexplamed amendment to Rule 14(a),
the Hansen court may have mterpreted mcorrectly the term "co-party"
First, tlus approach SImply Ignores the fact that the Rules contam no explicit
definition of "co-party." While courts must give meanmg to thIS word,
logic-hardly compels that a term found only m Rule 13(g) should be defined
solely on the basIs of an unexplamed change to a different rule. 85
Second, the unexplamed amendment to Rule 14(a) IS open to more than
one reasonable mterpretation. While the Hansen conclUSIOn IS certrunly a
possibility, the unexplruned change may have also manifested the mtent of
the framers of the Federal Rules to allow such cross-clrums. The framers
may have replaced "any other party" with "other third-party defendants"
SImply to elimmate superfluous words. 86 It IS possible that the framers of
the Rules recognIZed that Rule 13(g)'s use of the term "co-party" already
embraced the orIginal defendant/thIrd-party defendant relationshIp and that
therefore any language authorIzmg such claims m Rule 14(a) was unnecessary.87 Arguably, the lack of any explicit AdVISOry Committee explanatIOn

85. Where the literal reading of a statutory term would "compel an odd result," Green v.
Bock Laundry Machme Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1984 (1989), the Supreme Court has held that
it "must search for other eVidence of congressional mtent to lend the term its proper scope."
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566 (1989) (citations
omitted). '''The Circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,' for example, 'may
persuade.a court that Congress did not mtend words of common meamng to have. their literal
effect.'" Id. (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981».
Even though, as Judge Learned Hand said, "the words used, even m their literal
sense, are the prImary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of mterpreting
the meamng of any writing," nevertheless "it IS one of. the surest mdexes of a
mature and developed JUrIsprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary;
but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and Imagmative discovery IS the surest gUide to their meamng."
Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2566 (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.),
a/I'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
Lookmg beyond the naked text for gUidance IS perfectly proper when the result
it apparently decrees IS difficult to fathom or where it seems mconslstent with
Congress' mtention, smce the plam-meamng rule IS "rather an axiom of experIence
than a rule of law, and does not preclude conSideration of persuasive eVidence
if it eXists."
Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2566 (citation omitted) (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928». Compare Alemikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,
87 MICH. L. REv 20, 22-46 (discussmg textualism versus mtentionalism) with Murphy, Old
Maxllns Never Die: The "Plam-Meamng Rule" and Statutory Interpretation m the "Modern"
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv 1299 (1975).
86. The AdVISOry Committee's notes appear to confirm thiS reading. See supra note 83.
87. Cj. Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file):
The problem IS that F.R.Civ.P 14 permits third-party defendants to file "any
counterclaIms agaInst the third-party plaIntiff and cross-claIms agamst other thlrdparty defendants as prOVided m Rule 13" and prOVides that the third-party
defendant "may also assert any claIm agaInst the plamtiff arIsmg out of the
transaction or occurrence
" The same rule also prOVides: "A third-party
defendant may proceed under thiS rule agamst any person not a party to the
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cuts m favor of thIS mterpretation. One would assume that the AdvIsory
Committee would have felt compelled to elucIdate the reason for the
change-from the broader language of "any other party" to the seemmgly
more restnctIve language of "other thud-party defendants" -if It were
mtended to be substantIve. The lack of such an explanatIOn suggests that
the AdvISOry Committee did not mtend to restnct the availability of crossclrums between ongmal defendants and thIrd-party defendants whatsoever. 88
Even assummg that the AdvISOry Committee notes lean m favor of
forbIdding cross-clrums between ongmal defendants and thIrd-party defendants, that conclusIOn IS not dispositIve. The United States Supreme Court
has srud that the Committee's notes should be gIven weIght m determmmg
the validity, meanmg or consistency of the Federal Rules but that they are
not bmding authority 89 Furthermore, reliance solely upon either Rule 14(a)
or the CommIttee notes would m some mstances-notably thIS one-conflict
with the mandate of Rule 1.
Rule 1 requires that the Federal Rules be "construed to secure the Just,
speedy, and mexpenslve determmatIOn of every actIon."9O The courts have
applied Rule 1 broadly to many procedural questIons under many different
rules. 91 In Herbert v Lando,92 for example, the Supreme Court held that
Rule 26 must be construed subject to the decree of Rule l.93 Likewise, m

action who IS or may be liable to the third-party defendant for all or part of the
claim made In the action against the third-party defendant."
Thus, a claim by a third-party defendant agamst someone who IS not a plamtiff,
a third-party plaintiff, or a non-party to the action, IS not authonzed by Rule
14.
88. Another explanation IS that the AdvIsory Committee Simply overlooked the effect of
the Rule 14(a) amendment on the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime
Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (clung Hansen,
116 F.R.D. at 251).
89. MissIssIPPI Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); see also C. J.
Wieland & Son Dairy Prods. Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Wis. 1945) (the
Advisory Committee's notes are persuasive but cannot be accepted as authority).
90. FED. R. Cry P 1.
91. See, e.g., Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (The Federal
Rules "were mtended to embody a umtary concept of efficient and ·meamngful JudiCial
procedure, and
no smgle Rule can consequently be conSidered m a vacuum."); Camster
Co. v. Leahy, 182 F.2d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 1950) (The Rules "must be conSidered In relation
to one another."); National Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595, 599 (4th Cir. 1938)
(The procedure under Rule 26 of these Rules "is entitled to be liberally construed In accordance
with" Rule 1.); Umted States v. Pinto, 44 F.R.D. 357, 359 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (The Federal
Rules "are to be mterpreted m light of Rule I."); United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338,
339 (W.D. Mo. 1962) ("Each separate rule IS related to the general plan of the others and
must be so construed."); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1432, at 253
("Rule 13(g) must be read In conjunction With the other federal rules.").
92. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
93. [d. at 177 In Herbert, the plamtiff sought an order compelling discovery In a
defamation action. [d. at 156-57. In holding that Judges should not heSitate to exercise
appropnate control over the discovery process, the Court stated: "[T]he discovery prOVISions,
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Foman v. Davls,94 the Supreme Court noted the mandate of Rule 1 m
holding that it is contrary to the spIrit of the Federal Rules for a court to
aVOId a decIsion on the basIS of "mere techrucalities. "95 However, the
Supreme Court has also made clear that, although the Rules should be
"liberally construed, .,. they should not be expanded by disregarding
plamly expressed limitations."96 Thus, only if the mtent of the framers of
the Federal Rules is ambIguous regarding the definition of "co-party"
would it be legitimate to look to policy conSIderations to resolve the crossclrum debate.

IV

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Because thIS Note concludes from the discussIOn above that the mtent of
the framers of the Federal Rules IS ambIguous regarding the definition of
"co-party," a diversIon mto the realm of policy IS mevitable. HistorIcally,
the pnmary reasons behmd allowmg cross-claims have been to aVOId mUltiple
suits and to encourage determmation of an entire controversy with the
fewest procedural steps.97 ConsIstent with these policies, courts generally
have construed Rule 13(g) broadly m order to settle as many related clrums
as possible m a smgle proceeding. 98 Although the liberal use of cross-clrums
mcreases the risk that an action will become too complicated, courts can

like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the mjunction of Rule 1 that
they 'be construed to secure the just, speedy, and mexpenslve determmation of every action.'"
Id. at 177 (emphasis m ongmal). Thus, "the requirement of Rule 26(b)(1) that the matenal
sought m discovery be 'relevant' should be firmly applied, and the distnct courts should not
neglect their power to restnct discovery where 'justice requires [protection for] a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppreSSIOn, or undue burden or expense
", Id.
94. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
95. Id. at 181-82. In Fornan, a party filed a notice of appeal m federal court from a
judgment dismlssmg hiS complamt and subsequently filed a notice of appeal from a second
judgment denYIng lus motions to vacate the first judgment and to amend the complamt. Id.
at 179. The Supreme Court deCided that, where the first notice of appeal IS held to be
premature, the appeal from the second judgment should be treated as an effective attempt to
appeal from the first judgment. Id. at 181.
96. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121 (1964).
97. 6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mn.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 229 & n.5. Similar
purposes underlie third-party clrums under Rule 14. See, e.g., 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, ,
14.04, at 14-29 (footnote omitted) ("[I]mpleader allows the court to resolve the ultimate
liabilities In one suit Instead of two. Tlus mcluslve packaging spares the JudiCial system and
at least some of the parties the waste and expense of multiple suits. Concomitantly, it aVOids
the possibility of mconslstent judgments.").
98. 6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mru.ER & M. KANE, ~pra note 12, § 1431, at 230 n.6. Because
cross-clrums are always pernusslve and never compulsory under the Federal Rules, "a defendant
must deCide whether it IS best to litigate lus clrum m the same suit or whether it IS better to
bnng a separate action." WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANuAL § 7985 (1979) (footnote omitted).
But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-213(g)-(h) (1988) (contrumng proVISIons for both compulsory
and permissive cross-clrums). Courts should not usurp the ability of defendants to make tlus
tactical deCISion by narrowly construmg Federal Rule 13(g).
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readily allevIate thIS problem by ordering separate tnals under Rule 13(i).99
For thIS reason, most scholars encourage broad JOinder of clrums at the
pleading stage. 100
The policy reasons for allowing cross-clrums between co-defendants on
the SaIne level of the captIOn also apply In the context of cross-clrums
between ongInal defendants and thIrd-party defendants. First, by allOWing
such cross-claIms, all related matters can be litigated In one proceeding with
the fewest procedural steps. Parties need not file separate complrunts agrunst
one another, and motions to consolidate proceedings VIa Rule 42(a), at least
III thIS respect, become unnecessary Just as the wIdespread use of counterclaIms and thIrd-party claIms under Rule 13(a)-(b) and Rule 14(a) lowers
filing expenses and accelerates litIgatIOn, so too would the liberal use of
cross-claIms under Rule 13(g) reduce. costs and streamline the JudicIal
machinery
Second, if cross-clrums of the type discussed In thIS Note are not allowed,
courts will create an entIre category of cases where related matters cannot
be litIgated In one proceeding without extra procedural difficulty. Shrewd
lawyers will delay proceedings by challenging clrums brought under the
wrong procedural mechanIsm, and abuses may result if lawyers wait to
assert challenges until close to tnal lOI or solely for the purpose of embarraSSing OppOSing counsel. Courts have cautIOned In the past that a lawsuit
should no longer be VIewed "as if it were 'in the nature of a cock-fight,'
so that 'the litIgant who wIshes to succeed must try and get an advocate

99. Rule 13(i) prOVides:
If the court orders separate tnals as prOVided m Rule 42(b), Judgment on a
counterclrum or cross-clalm may be rendered m accordance with the terms of
Rule 54(b) when the court has JUrIsdiction so to do, even if the clrums of the
opposmg party have been diSmIssed or otherwise disposed of.
FED. R. Crv P 13(i); see also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1437,
at 281-82 (describmg Rule 13(i) m greater detail). Thus, under Rule 13(i), a court has discretion
to mvoke Rule 42(b) and order separate trials of the clrums m a gIven matter.
Rule 42(b) prOVides:
The court, m furtherance of convemence or to aVOid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducIve to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any clrum, cross-clrum, counterclrum, or trurd-party clrum, or of any separate
Issue or of any number of clrums, cross-clrums, counterclrums, trurd-party clrums,
or Issues, always preservmg mVIOlate the right of trial by JUry as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United
States.
FED. R. Crv P 42(b); see also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 17, §§ 2387-91, at 277304 (describmg Rule 42(b) m greater detail).
100. See, e.g., 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 230.
101. But see GeorgIa Ports Auth. v. ConstruZlom Meccamche Industnali GenovesI, S.P.A.,
119 F.R.D. 693, 695 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1988) ("[E]ven if Falcon's construction of Rule 13(g) IS
correct, any techmcal objection to CMI's cross-clrum would appear to have been wruved by
delay m P!essmg It.").
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who IS a game bIrd with the best pluck and the sharpest spurs." , 102 The
Federal Rules were Intended to supersede thIS "sporting theory of Justice." 103
As the court In Georgza Ports Authorzty suggested, the Federal Rules
enVlSlon three types of claIms that defendants may assert: counterclaIms,
thIrd-party claIms and cross-claIms.l04 Rule 13(a)-(b) prOVIdes that counterclaIms may be brought agaInst OPPOSIng parties. lOS Rule 14(a) prOVIdes that
thIrd-party complaInts may be brought agaInst persons not already parties. 106
And Rule 13(g) prOVIdes that cross-claIms may be asserted agaInst coparties. 107
AssumIng that the framers of the Rules Intended that these be the only
three types of claIms defendants could brIng and that every such claIm
should fit Into one of these three categories, one question remaIns: how
would the framers of the Rules define these categorIes? To accomplish theIr
purpose, the best method would be to create a system fitting every claIm
Into one of the three categorIes. To do this withIn the definitional framework
laId out In Georgza Ports Authority, the first step would be to distingUIsh
claIms agaInst parties to a lawsuit from claIms agaInst parties not Involved
In a lawsuit. All possible claims must fit In one of these two groups: claIms
agaInst parties and claIms agaInst non-parties. Because Rule 14(a) prOVIdes
for assertion of a thIrd-party complaInt agaInst any "person not a party to
the action," 108 the only way to assure that all claIms will be categorIzed In
one of the three categorIes is to allow "cross-claIms" or "counterclaIms"
agaInst any person already a party to an action. For, unless the uruverse
of claIms is diVIded Into two perfect halves In thIS way, the temptation will
eXIst for courts to create by default yet a fourth category of claIms.
To illustrate the logic underlYIng thIs temptation, suppose one needed to
know how many lollipops out of ten JackIe perceIved to be red. The best
method IS to ask JackIe whether she thInks each lollipop IS "red" or "not
red." OtherwIse, if an open-ended question is asked, the questioner may
have to deal with an answer like "vermillion." Did JackIe Intend the
"vermillion" response to be taken as a subset of red, a subset of orange
or a subset of neither?

102. Barnett v. Jaspan (In re Barnett), 124 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1942) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Manson, Cross-Exammation: A Socratic Fragment, 8 LAW Q. REv 160, 161 (1892».
103. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 996 (2d Cir. 1942). '''The Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading IS a game of skill In whIch one mIsstep by counsel may be
declSlve to the outcome and accept the pnnclple that the purpose of pleading IS to facilitate
a proper deCISIOn on the merits.'" Foman v. DaVIS, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962) (quotIng
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957».
104. Georgia Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695.
105. FED. R. CIV. P 13(a)-(b).
106. FED. R. Crv. P 14(a).
107. FED. R. Crv P 13(g).
108. FED. R. Crv P 14(a) (emphasIs added).
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If thIS line of lOgIC IS the best way to solve the problem at hand, then
every court, except the Georgza Ports Authority· court, has gone about
defimng "co-party" m the wrong way Instead of focusmg on the framers'
probable purpose-to classify all claIms by defendants either as Hurd-party
claIms, counterclaIms or cross-claIms-courts have tended to divme the
meanmg of "co-party" from the word itself. For example, m Schwab v.
Ene Lackawanna Railroad Co. v Sauers,I09 the court concentrated on the
adversanal relationshIp between the defendant and the thIrd-party defendant. lIO Because of thIS mIstaken focus, the court concluded that these two
partIes could not be co-partIes withm the meanmg of Rule 13(g). Even the
court m Fogel, WhICh reached the same conclusIOn as does thIS Note,
focused on the prefix "co-" rather than on the purpose of the Federal
Rules as artIculated by Rule 1. 1I1
Rather than attemptmg to define "co-party" by lookmg at the word
itself,1I2 a sounder approach IS to define the term withm the context of the

109. 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971).
110. [d. at 66; see also McWhIrter Distrib. Co. v. Texaco Inc., 668 F.2d 511, 527 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Schwab) ("Texaco and DOE were adverse parties rather than
co-parties."); Stahl v. OhIO River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970) (emphasIs In ongInal)
("[C]ross-clatms are filed agatnst co-parties and not agrunst adverse parties."); Capital Care
Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) ("[Bjefore the thIrd-party defendants filed theIr crossclatms, theIr relationshIp to the nonsUing defendants was sufficIently non-adverse to qualify the latter as co-parties."); Pitcavage
v. Mastercraft Boat Co., 632 F Supp. 842, 849 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (citing Stahl) ("Cross-clatms
are filed agatnst co-partIes and not agatnst adverse parties. "). But see Georgia Ports Auth.,
119 F.R.D. at 695 (critiCIzing the suggestion of some courts that onglnal defendants and thIrdparty defendants are not "co-parties" because they are adverse).
Ill. Fogel v. United Gas Improvement Co., 32 F.R.D. 202, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The Fogel
court did not mention Rule 1 or the 1946 atnendment to Rule 14{a) In its opinIOn. When
faced with the contention that "co-party" meant "equal party, as for Instance one of several
onglnal defendants," the court stated sImply. that "[tjhIS contention IS Incorrect." [d. Citing
the dictionary definition of the prefix "co-" was the only support the Fogel court gave for
its deCISIon. [d.
112. If courts inSiSt on fOCUSing on the term "co-party," the Fogel court arguably was
correct In construing it to allow cross-claims between onglnal defendants and thIrd-party
defendants. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) defines "co-" as "[aj prefix meaning
with, In conjunction, JOint, JOintly, unitedly, and not separately[.j" [d. at 256. That source
further defines "party" as follows:
A person concerned or haVing or taking part In any affrur, matter, transaction,
or proceeding, conSidered indiVIdually. A "party" to an action IS a person whose
natne IS desIgnated on record as platntiff or defendant. Term, In general, means
one haVing nght to control proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and crossexatnlne witnesses, and to appeal from Judgment.
[d. at 1122 (citations omitted).
Both onglnal defendants and thIrd-party defendants can be conSIdered to be particIpating
"in conjunction with" a gIven proceeding. Both such parties have control over legal proceedings
and are desIgnated on record with the court. In fact, In the case of an Indemnity clatm, an
allegation between an onglnal defendant and a thIrd-party defendant IS one In WhICh one party
asserts that the other party must stand In its shoes if liability IS found to attach. Thus, In the
case of an Indemmty clatm by an ongInal defendant agatnst a thud-party defendant, It would
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Federal Rules. If Rule 14(a) thtrd-party chums are categorized as "not party
to the action" chums, all other clrums assertable by defendants need only
be categonzed either as counterclaims or cross-clrums. To do thts, the
umverse of remaimng clrums should be divIded once agrun according to a
"something" I"not somethtng" classification system. Without thts divIsIon,
the problems associated with any definition of "co-party" are Immediately
foreseeable. For Instance, the Stahl court's definition of "co-parties" as
"parties on the same sIde of the mrun litigation"lI3 may leave some clrums
uncategonzed because this definition and the standard definition of a
counterclaim are not mutually exclusIveY4 LikewIse, because the eXIsting

be unfrur to procedurally mhibit such a clrum-by requmng the filing of an mdependent
action-merely because of the fortuitous circumstance that the plruntiff did not sue the thlrdparty defendant m the ongmal action.
113. Stahl, 424 F.2d at 55; see also Rochester Am. Ins. Co. v. Cassell Truck Lmes, Inc.,
195 Kan. 51, 54, 402 P.2d 782, 784 (1965) (applymg KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-213(g» (stating
cross·clrums are "between parties on the same Side of the case"); Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn.
245, 255, 52 N.W.2d 446, 451 (1952) (applymg MINN. R. CIv. P 13.07) (suggesting that coparties be defined as those parties which are "aligned on the same Side of the litigation").
114. The Stahl court's definition of "co-party" IS unattractive for three reasons. First,
determmmg which parties are on the same Side of the mam litigation IS extremely difficult.
Given the countless postures 10 which modem day litigants find themselves, it IS often Impossible
to deternune on whose Side any gIVen litigant IS. "As between the third-party plruntiffs and
the third-party defendants, it IS converuent to regard them as adversanes, at least for the
purpose of counterclrums, even though, as a practical matter, it often happens that their
pnmary objective IS the common defense agrunst plruntiff's clalIDs." Capital Care Corp. v.
Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
Compare ,d. ("In a sense, both the ongmal defendants and the third-party defendants are
sunilarly situated, m that each IS bemg charged (by someone) with liability for the clrums
asserted by the plruntiffs.") with Hansen v. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D.
246, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("To the extent that Manfredo and Guptill both stood to lose if
Hansen prevailed
they rrught be VIewed as 'parties on the same Side of the mrun litigation'
and the conclUSiOn rrught be reached that a clrum by Guptill agrunst Manfredo IS a crossclrum."). Although explanatory notes to one state cross-clalID rule suggest that "Rule 13(g)
regulates clrums between
parties on the same Side of the versus[,]" MAss. R. CIv. P 13(g)
reporters' notes (emphasis m ongmal), tins IS sunilarly unhelpful. Ongmal defendants and
third-party defendants both appear on the opposite Side of the plruntiff/ongmal defendant
"versus," and before cross-clrums are asserted between ongmal defendants and third-party
defendants, such parties have no legal relationship whatsoever other than that both parties
happen to be mvolved m the same proceeding.
Second, aside from bemg adopted only In dicta by the Stahl court, defirung "co-parties"
as those parties on the same Side of the mrun litigation would be unduly burdensome on the
courts. Judges would have to decide, through a kind of balancmg test, whether litigants are
adverse or non-adverse towards one another. An example of this balancmg approach IS found
In the case of In re Queeny/Connthos, 503 F Supp. 361, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (emphasIs In
ongmal) (citation omitted):
To be on the same Side of the litigation these parties need not have an Identity
of Interests, ISSUes or positions with respect to each other, but need only stand
In a sImilar posture In relation to clrums of opposmg parties brought agamst
each of them, even though such clalIDS are brought separately, by different
parties, and on different legal theones. Certrunly the Queeny Interests, owners
and operators of the Queeny, and the products defendants, builders of and
manufacturers of eqwpment for the Queeny, are more easily Identified as standing
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definition of a counterclrum only allows such clrums between those parties
who are "opposmg parties,"lIs some clrums related to the subject matter of
the ongmal lawsuit will not be classifiable as either counterclrums or crossclrums with Murray's non-dichotomous definitlOn of "co-party," that IS,
"parties havmg like status."116 For, as thls Note illustrates, It IS entirely
possible for one party to have a clrum agrunst another party who IS not an
opposmg party yet who IS not a party of like status either.·

on the same side of tlus litigation than as on opposing sIdes. On the opposing
sIde are parties such as the Connthos Interests and BP/SohiO wluch IS also a
plaintiff In the products liability action. ThIS Court has already determmed that
the Queeny was at fault In the colliSIon between it and the Connthos. The
Queeny Interests allege that the products defendants, builders and suppliers of
the Queeny, are liable for the colliSIon under a products liability theory. The
Connthos mterests, BP/Soluo, and other claimants on the opposing SIde of the
litigation are the parties WhICh were Injured as a result of the actions of Queeny.
Thus, on one SIde stands those parties actually or allegedly responsible for the
colliSIon, and on the other SIde stands those parties Injured or damaged.
Thus, the Stahl definition of "co-party" demands a case-by-case analYSIS, WhIch reqUIres a
conSIderable amount of time on the part of courts to admiruster. Instead of fOCUSing on the
configuration of the parties and theIr clrums, a sounder approach lies In diVIding all clrums
by parties to an action Into two mutually exclUSIve categones-counterclaIms and cross-claims.
Tlurd, because the Stahl approach requires a balancmg scheme, it-like all other Interestweiglung approaches-will be subject to marupulation by courts. If a court finds a litigant's
claim has merit, it could construe "co-party" broadly to allow that claim's assertion. Conversely, if a court finds a litigant's claim lackmg m merit, it could construe "co-party"
narrowly to prohibit that claim's assertion. Even if a court merely dismIsses a claim without
prejudice, such marupulation of the tenn "co-party" would VIolate the SPIrit of the Federal
Rules, wluch require courts to deCIde cases on theIr merits rather than on procedural techruca1ities. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. An extreme case of marupulation could
occur if claims of the type discussed m thIS Note are allowed under Rule 13(h) Instead of
Rule 13(g). For, unlike the practice before Rule 13(h)'s amendment In 1966 of
jOIrung parties "as defendants," the parties are to be aligned according to theIr
Interests. Specifically, the Note states that "the party pleading the claim IS to be
regarded as a plaintiff and the additional parties as plaintiffs or defendants as
the case may be, and amended Rules 19 and 20 are to be applied In the usual
fasluon." . Once the parties are aligned according to their actual mterest In the
suit, then the court must determine whether federal junsdiction will be affected
by their addition. If the added party's real Interest IS with plaintiff and lus
citizenslup IS the same as defendant, then he carmot be JOined for lus presence
will destroy the preeXisting diversity, unless a compUlsory counterclaim IS Involved.
Of course, if the added party IS correctly aligned as a defendant, then the
Junsdictional pnncipies applicable to counterclaims and cross-claims will govern.
6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1434, at 266-67 (footnotes omitted)
(quoting FED. R. Crv P 13 adVISOry committee's note). As one can observe, if parties are
allowed to assert the type of claims discussed In tlus Note under Rule 13(h), a court's
marupulation of the tenn "co-party" could easily prevent an entire controversy from being
deCIded In one forum because a court could refuse to hear part of a claim on JUrIsdictional
grounds. Under Rule 13(g), on the other hand, courts would always have ancillary JUrISdiction
over cross-claims between such parties, and the balanCing of parties' Interests In a glven piece
of litigauon would be unnecessary. See supra note 70.
115. FED. R. Crv P 13 (a)-(b).
116. Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F SUpp. 5, 6 (B.D. Pa. 1968).
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As a result, under both the Stahl and Murray approaches, some defendants' chums will never be classifiable under the Federal Rules. Parties will
be forced forever to file separate complaints and, subsequently, motions
for consolidation under Rule 42(a). Only by allOWing counterclaIms agaInst
opposmg parties and cross-claims agaInst non-opposmg parties was the court
In Georgia Ports Authority able to evade the definitional quagmrre surrounding the term "co-party."lI7

V.

PROPOSAL

In light of the conflict among authorities over the mearung of the term
"co-party," the Federal Rules should be amended to clear up the confUSIon.
First, Rule 13(g) should define "co-party" explicitly. A clear definitional
clause added to that .Rule would make it unnecessary for courts to examine
the Intent of the framers of the Federal Rules and relevant policy conSIderations. If the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules l18 wIshed to allow crossclaIms between ongInal defendants and thIrd-party defendants, it could say
so explicitly; if the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules wanted to prohibit
such cross-clrums, it could articulate that, toO.119

117. GeorgIa Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695.
118. The AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules IS the body that first conSIders proposed rule
changes. See FEDERAL Crvn. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES XXI-XXII (West 1990) for a list
of the members of the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules as constituted March 1, 1990. Tros
body was appomted pursuant to an act passed by Congress July 11, 1958 (28 U.S.C. § 331
(1988» authoIlzmg the JudiCIal Conference of the United States to make a continuous study
of the Federal Rules. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2073(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990) ("The JudiCIal
Conference may authoIlZe the appomtment of committees to asSISt the Conference by recommending rules to be prescribed under section 2072 of tills title."). According to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2073(a)(I), "[t}he JudiCIal Conference shall prescribe and publish the procedures for the
conSIderation of proposed rules[.}"
119. Under the current statutory scheme, the U.S. Supreme Court has the power "to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" for federal diStIlct courts. 28 U.S.C.A. §
2072 (West Supp. 1990). "The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than
May 1 of the year m wroch a rule prescribed under section 2072 IS to become effective a copy
of the proposed rule." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(a) (West Supp. 1990). If Congress does nothmg
witron the seven-month penod prOVIded for by the statute, the new rule goes mto effect. [d.
("Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year m wroch such rule IS so
transmitted unless otherwIse prOVIded by law.").
However, the JudiCIal Conference Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and EVIdence
("Standing Committee") and the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules are the two bodies that
continuously study the operations of the Federal Rules. FEDERAL Crvn. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
AND RULES, supra note 118, at X. The Standing Committee coordinates the work of the
AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules, makes suggestions of proposals to be studied by them,
conSIders proposals recommended by the AdVISOry Committee and transmits such proposals
with its recommendation to the JudiCIal Conference. [d. at XII. If the JudicIal Conference
approves of a proposal, it formally forwards its report and recommendations to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West Supp. 1990). For a complete disCllsslon of the ruleamending process, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 331; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2072-2074; and FEDERAL Crvn.
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES, supra note 118, at X-XIII.
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For the reasons discussed In thIS Note, however, the term "co-party"
should be defined as "any party that IS not an OPPOSIng party."I20 ThIS
definition would divIde and lOgIcally categorIZe all possible claIms a defendant may assert agaInst partIes to a lawsuit Into two all-InclusIve groups.
Every claIm between defendants and thIrd-party defendants would have to
be, by definition, eIther a counterclaIm or a cross-claIm. Furthermore,
defimng "co-party" as "any party that IS not an OPPOSIng party" would
evade the line-draWIng problems caused by (or resulting from) attempts to
fit counterclaIms and cross-claIms Into non-mutually exclUSIve pIgeonholes.
In addition to amending Rule 13(g), Rule 14(a) should be amended to
allow "cross-claIms agaInst other co-partIes, as prOVIded In Rule 13." The
definition gIven "co-party" In Rule 13(g) also should be Incorporated by
reference Into Rule 14(a). Tills would elimInate any ambIguity about the
availability of cross-claIms between ongInal defendants and thIrd-party
defendants and make the Federal Rules Internally conSIstent. 121
CONCLUSION

The definition of "co-party" under Rule 13(g) has broad Implications for
the litIgation process. Amencans have filed more than 200,000 CIvil cases
120. Oklahoma has enacted a rule which prOVides that "[a] pleading may state as a crosschum any chum by one party agrunst any party who IS not an opposmg party[.]" OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2013(G) (West Supp. 1991). However, the committee comment to § 2013 states
that subsection G applies only to "a c1rum asserted by a party' agrunst another party on the
same Side of the action, such as a defendant agrunst a co-defendant or a plruntiff agrunst a
co-plruntiff. It does not apply to a c1rum asserted by a defendant agrunst a plruntiff or agrunst
a third-party defendant." [d. committee comment. Although thIs comment undoubtedly was
mtended merely to distingUish cross-c1rums from counterclrums and third-party c1rums brought
under § 2013(A)-(B) and § 2014(A) (Oklahoma's respective counterparts to Federal Rules 13(a)(b) and 14(a», the Oklahoma statute suggests that any definition of "co-party" under the
Federal Rules should state explicitly that "co-party" encompasses the relationshIp between
ongmal defendants and tlurd-party defendants when Rules 13(a)-(b) or 14(a) are mapplicable.
For a more detailed descnption of the rationale underlYIng Oklahoma's cross-c1rum prOVISion,
see Fraser, Counterclalfns, Cross-ClaIms, and Third-Party ClaIms Under the Oklahoma Pleading
Code, 39 OKLA. L. REv I, 12-14 (1986). Professor Fraser's article, whIch was written before
Oklahoma's cross-c1rum provISIon was amended m 1988, argued that "co-party" withIn §
2013(G) "should be liberally construed so that all c1rums agrunst parties to an action that anse
out of a transaction or occurrence can be Jomed." [d. at 13. He continued: "The Oklahoma
Supreme Court should mterpret section 2013(G) as permitting a party to an action to assert
any c1rum that arises out of a transaction or occurrence that IS already subject to the Junsdiction
of the court agrunst a person who IS already a party to the action." [d. at 14. Accepting
Professor Fraser's suggestion that, "to aVOid the possibility that thiS section will be construed
techrucally, section 2013(G) should be amended," the Oklahoma Legislature m 1988 adopted
language consistent with Fraser's proposal. Compare Id. with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
20 13 (G). Today, a comment to the 1988 amendment of § 2013 contruned m the Oklahoma
Statutes Annotated by Professor Fraser states that the amendment "makes it unnecessary for
the courts to determme who IS a co-party." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2013 comment.
121. To make the Federal Rules completely conSistent, the AdVISOry Committee on Civil
Rules should follow the lead of Montana and add the words "or co-party" to the end of
Federal Rule 18(a). See MONT. R. Crv. P 18(a) adVISOry committee's note to Sept. 29, 1967
amendment ("[T]he words 'or co-party' are added to the Montana amendment for consistency
With the prOVISions of thiS amendment for cross-claims and Rule 13(g). ").
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in United States distnct courts each year smce 1982,122 and defendants and
tlnrd-party defendants frequently must assert clrums agamst one another.
Wlnchever definition of "co-parties" IS accepted-either those parties on
the same sIde of the mam litigation, those parties havmg like status or those
parties that are not opposing parties-it is clear that each of these definitions
will have sIgnificant consequences for litigants. Whether a court allows
cross-claims between ongmal defendants and thrrd-party defendants or
compels these parties to file separate complrunts agrunst one another, the
definition of "co-party" matters because it has the potential to create extra
filings and procedural difficulties thereby costing parties and courts time
and money.
Until the Federal Rules are amended, "co-party" should be defined
according to the policIes that lie behmd the Federal Rules. There IS no
persuasIve authority showmg that the framers of the Rules mtended otherWIse. Rule 1's mandate that the Federal Rules- "be construed to secure the
Just, speedy, and mexpensive determmation of every action" should be
gIven broad effect. l23 Because the Rules presume that as many related clrums
as possible be resolved m a smgle proceeding,l24 the only legitimate way to
define "co-party" IS to examme the purpose of the Federal Rules. Given
the absence of any policy reasons disfavonng cross-clrums between ongmal
defendants and tlnrd-party defendants, the Federal Rules should permit such
cross-clrums.

122. According to the latest available figures, 233,529 total CIvil cases were commenced m
U.S. distnct courts dunng the twelve month penod ending June 30, 1989. 1989 ADMIN. OFF.
OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REp. 8-9 (Table 4). Total CIvil cases commenced for other years ending
June 30 were as follows: 1982, 206,193; 1983, 241,842; 1984, 261,485; 1985, 273,670; 1986,
254,828; 1987, 239,185; 1988, 239,634. Id.
123. See also Bauer, SchIavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration oj the Supreme Court's
Role as Interpreter oj the Federal Rules oj Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv 720,
730 (1988) ("Although [Rule 1] obVIOusly does not prOVIde an answer to any specific question
of the mterpretation of any of the Federal Rules, it defines a context or, if you will, a
predisposition agamst unnecessarily ngld or grudging mterpretations of the Rules. "); Doble,
supra note 17, at 262 n.3 (citations omitted) (the author was a member of the AdVISOry
Committee appomted to draft the Federal Rules) ("The committee meant every word of [the
Rule 1] sentence, and it IS smcerely hoped that federal Judges will mterpret and apply the rules
m thIS SPIrit. ").
124. As three scholars have stated, "In keepmg with tms policy [of aVOIding mUltiple suits]
the courts generally have construed [Rule 13(g)] liberally m order to settle as many related
clrums as possible m a smgle action." 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12,
§ 1431, at 229-30 (footnote omitted); see also LASA Per L'Industna Del Marmo Socleta Per
AzIom v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir. 1969); Provldential-Dev. Co. v. United States
Steel Co., 236 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1956); Blrur v. Cleveland TWIst Drill Co., 197 F.2d
842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952); Old Homestead Bread Co. v. Contmental Bakmg Co., 47 F.R.D.
560, 563-64 n.7 (D. Colo. 1969).

